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1. Introduction 
Does the choice of exchange rate and monetary regime matter for economic growth? In his 
paper on exchange rate regimes in the modern era, Rose (2011) argues that “views appear to 
be strongly held and sincere, yet they seem to have neither discernible causes nor visible 
consequences” (p. 621). Indeed, Rose concludes the paper by noting that: “the stakes could 
not be lower” (p. 621). 
Nevertheless, a fairly new monetary regime – a floating/flexible exchange rate with an 
inflation target (IT) – has gained an increasing number of adherents, at least since the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98.1 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (2001), for example, 
argue that the potential benefits to be obtained from the adoption of an IT regime are 
substantial. Some of the purported gains are lower and less variable inflation and interest 
rates, more stable growth and an enhanced ability to respond to shocks without losing 
credibility. Others have added that IT countries may be better adapted to dealing with an 
economic crisis. In particular, a credible IT regime may allow for greater monetary easing 
without jeopardising the inflation outlook; and, in a time when deflationary risks are 
looming large, the credibility of an IT regime can certainly play an important role in 
avoiding a liquidity trap (Krugman, 1999). This type of thinking was, for example, behind 
the Bank of Japan’s decision to formally adopt an IT regime in early 2013.  
A central element of an IT regime is the flexibility of the exchange rate. This may prove 
important in a crisis. For instance, consider the immediate response to the crisis in Sweden: 
The central bank significantly lowered policy rates, which led to currency depreciation, 
improved Swedish competitiveness and caused an increase in exports (OECD, 2011).2 This 
echoes important research on the Great Depression, where it has been shown that currency 
depreciation conferred important macroeconomic benefits (not necessarily beggar-thy-
neighbour effects) on initiating countries (see Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Bernanke, 1995). 
                                                   
* Thomas Barnebeck Andersen (barnebeck@sam.sdu.dk) and Nikolaj Malchow-Møller 
(nmm@sam.sdu.dk) are in the Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern 
Denmark. Jens Nordvig is Head of Fixed Income Research Americas, Nomura Securities 
(jnordvig@me.com). 
1 We follow Rose (2011, 2014) and distinguish between three categories of monetary regimes: i) hard 
fix, ii) floating/flexible exchange rates with inflation targeting and iii) other regimes, including soft 
pegs and floats with other targets than inflation. We will return to this issue below. 
2 The SEK currency move also reflected tensions in global interbank markets, which affected Swedish 
banks with large dollar liabilities and thereby depressed the SEK by forcing USD buying and SEK 
selling; see, for example, Nomura Securities (2009). 
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Such a (unilateral) response to a crisis would be impossible under an inflexible exchange rate, 
including hard and soft pegs. Here, a country would have to follow the monetary policy of 
the country to which its currency is pegged or, in the case of a currency union, rely on a 
concerted effort. This leads to a related problem with monetary policy under inflexible 
exchange rates, namely “when one size does not fit all” (Nechio, 2011). For example, simple 
Taylor-rule recommendations for the eurozone as a whole have been broadly consistent with 
ECB policy, but the more pertinent question concerns the appropriateness of the eurozone 
rate both for the individual eurozone economies and for the countries that have a fixed 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro.  
Denmark, a country with a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro, is a case in point. By the 
fall of 2005, the first signs of ‘overheating’ were beginning to show in Denmark (OECD 2005). 
Yet, monetary conditions appropriate for the eurozone as a whole were providing stimulus 
to the Danish economy. By the spring of 2006, when the economy was clearly overheated, 
monetary policy was still adding fuel to the economy (OECD, 2006). Hence, the OECD 
recommended that fiscal policy should be tightened, and reiterated the urgency of increasing 
labour supply, both by strengthening work incentives and by making it easier for foreigners 
to enter sectors like construction. The government did not comply. At this juncture, the 
obvious policy would have been an interest rate increase – as clearly recommended by a 
simple Taylor rule (OECD, 2008) – but such policy was ruled out by design. The upshot of all 
this, it has been argued, was that Denmark suffered a deep and prolonged economic crisis 
(Sørensen, 2013).  
The present paper analyses whether flexible exchange rates with an inflation target conferred 
benefits in terms of economic growth during the crisis years 2007-12 on countries that 
followed this particular monetary strategy relative to countries that adhered to other 
strategies, in particular a fixed exchange rate regime. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. 
First, we consider the set of OECD countries, where all countries (except two) operated 
under either an IT regime or a fixed exchange rate regime in the period considered. Second, 
to enhance the robustness of our results, we also look beyond the OECD. The advantage of 
doing so is that we can enlarge the sample by more countries. The disadvantages, which 
should not be overlooked, are first that data quality is lower, and second that we cannot 
control for the same type of variables as when only considering OECD countries. The second 
disadvantage is minimised by the fact that we have a good instrumental variable (for the 
monetary regime) at hand. Furthermore, looking beyond the OECD also allows us to include 
other alternatives to IT such as soft pegs and floats with other targets than inflation in the 
comparison group. 
Our results show that countries with an IT monetary regime weathered the financial crisis 
much better than countries with alternative regimes – predominantly countries with a fixed 
exchange rate. This holds in the full OECD sample; it holds when we exclude the five so-
called peripheral eurozone countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain); and it holds 
when we exclude all eurozone countries. IT also outperforms the fixed exchange rate regime 
in the extended sample with more than 100 countries – also when instrumenting the choice 
of monetary regime. It also holds when we include alternatives to a fixed exchange rate 
regime in the comparison group. It is, in other words, a robust empirical finding.  
Using the OECD sample, we also show that the explanation for this difference in growth 
performance is, to some extent, found in differences in export growth during the initial years 
of the crisis. The difference in export performance may in turn be explained by the fact that 
IT countries on average experienced larger real (effective) exchange rate depreciations in the 
initial years of the crisis. However, we also find that real exchange rate depreciations can 
only explain part of the difference in performance between IT and non-IT countries. Thus, IT 
also appears to have had other positive effects, which we do not identify in the present paper. 
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Some caveats are in order concerning the extent to which our findings lend themselves to 
generalisations. Looking at a short and extraordinary period of five years is risky if one 
wants to draw general conclusions about the merits of a certain monetary regime. Yet, it 
makes sense to single out the time period 2007-12 exactly because it is extraordinary. The 
world has experienced the worst crisis since the Great Depression; activist monetary policy is 
operating in unchartered territory; and there is even talk about an enduring negative natural 
rate of interest (or, equivalently, that the liquidity trap is no longer an exceptional state of 
affairs going forward – it is the new normal).3 In this light, the 2007-12 period may be one of 
the best tests of the relative performance of different monetary regimes. Indeed, since a 
widespread view before the crisis held that different monetary regimes performed equally 
well, the fact that IT outperformed the hard fix during the crisis should certainly count for 
something.  
Our paper is related to a number of earlier empirical studies exploring the economic 
consequences of IT. Analysing the period 1960-2002, Ball and Sheridan (2004) show that 
adopting IT appears to have been irrelevant for a group of 20 developed economies, entailing 
neither gains nor losses in terms of economic performance. Analysing a group of emerging 
economies, Gonçalves and Salles (2008) show that IT did appear to matter for these 
economies. Rose (2014) explores the growth consequences of monetary regimes during 2007-
11, and he does not find a positive effect of IT on growth. The reason for this ‘non-finding’ 
may be that Rose does not employ a growth regression. Instead, he compares time-
demeaned growth rates across regimes. Moreover, he also excludes large countries as well as 
the entire eurozone. Our paper is also related to de Carvalho Filho (2010). Combining 
developed and emerging economies, he explores the implications of inflation targeting for 
various economic indicators with data through 2009. He finds, among other things, that IT 
countries had higher GDP growth.  
Our paper differs from the aforementioned papers in several important respects. First, and 
most importantly, we analyse more recent data. Like Rose (2014), this allows us to include 
the European sovereign debt crisis years in our observation window. The eurozone crisis 
exploded in May 2010 and stabilised in the summer of 2012 when Mario Draghi pledged to 
do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”4 Our observation window, 2007-12, captures 
both these events. Second, our empirical methodology is different from all the 
aforementioned papers. Finally, we also pay closer attention to the potential endogeneity of 
the monetary regime. In particular, we show using OLS, random effects, instrumental 
variables and treatment-effects regressions that IT countries had higher growth than non-IT 
countries during 2007-12. 
Our paper is also related to research on the Great Depression such as Eichengreen and Sachs 
(1985) and Bernanke (1995), who emphasise the role of currency depreciation (i.e. going off 
gold) in escaping the negative growth dynamics of the Great Depression. 
A final caveat is warranted. Whelan (2013) voices concerns that IT can restrict central banks 
in their ability to get us out of the crisis. While this paper shows that inflation targeting with 
flexible exchange rates has done better than fixed exchange rates, it does not address the 
issue of whether untested alternatives such as nominal GDP targeting would do better. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the concept of inflation 
targeting; sections 3 and 4 contain our empirical analyses of the OECD sample and the 
extended sample, respectively; and section 5 concludes.  
                                                   
3  See, for example, remarks by Paul Krugman (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/ 
secular-stagnation-coalmines-bubbles-and-larry-summers/.) 
4 The notorious speech by ECB President Mario Draghi was delivered on 26 July 2012 in London. 
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2. What is inflation targeting? 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was the first central bank to adopt inflation targeting (IT) 
in 1990. This move was part of a wider political aim, which entailed giving public-sector 
bodies a clear, simple and quantifiable target to which they could be held accountable 
(Davies and Green, 2010). As such, inflation targeting can be said to have been derived from 
a political initiative. Yet IT was fully consistent with important erstwhile theoretical 
developments in economics.  
Specifically, IT as a monetary policy regime was stimulated by two key intellectual 
understandings: i) Friedman’s (1968) insight that there is no long-run trade-off between 
inflation and output, and ii) the literature on dynamic inconsistency initiated by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977).  
Friedman’s insight excited economists about the idea that central banks should focus on 
what they could control, viz. the inflation rate; and since people tend to dislike inflation, it 
should be a low one. Kydland and Prescott’s work taught that because of a short-run trade-
off between inflation and output, it was important to ensure that central banks would resist 
the temptation to ‘cheat’ on an inflation target (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Whelan, 2013).  
In theory, the mechanics of IT are pretty straightforward. The central bank forecasts the 
future path of inflation using all available information – including the current and possibly 
the future monetary stance – and it compares the forecast with the target inflation rate. The 
difference between the two determines how much monetary policy has to be adjusted. IT 
should not be understood as a strict pre-commitment to a policy rule (Bernanke and Mishkin, 
1997; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2010). The target is sometimes set as a range (say 1-3%), in which 
case the central bank is left with considerable discretion regarding where in the range it 
wants to be, and sometimes as an exact number, leaving the central bank with less discretion. 
In both cases, IT provides a rule-like framework within which the central bank has some 
discretion to react to shocks (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2010). At the same time, inflation targeting 
is typically (although not necessarily) accompanied by flexible exchange rates, which has the 
potential to make the economy more resilient to external shocks. To the extent that 
intermediate targets, such as the exchange rate, are used, the inflation goal will take 
precedence in case of conflict (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). In the empirical analysis below, 
IT countries are defined as countries with an inflation target and a floating exchange rate. 
IT has received much criticism since the crisis began (see e.g. Whelan, 2013). Critics hold that 
IT focused too narrowly on consumer price inflation in the run-up to the crisis, thereby 
ignoring asset price inflation and related financial stability issues. It has also been claimed 
that IT resulted in expected inflation that was too low. With the economy trapped near the 
zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, this has made it difficult to reduce real interest 
rates and provide monetary stimulus (Japan is a key example of this up to recently). Yet, the 
credibility embedded in IT has also been heralded as providing a route out of a liquidity trap 
by helping the central bank to “credibly promise to be irresponsible” (Krugman, 1999). 
Hence, there has been plenty of debate about the merits of IT as a monetary regime, and its 
ability to secure superior macroeconomic outcomes relative to alternative monetary policy 
regimes. However, there is little consensus at this point. 
3. Empirical analysis: OECD sample 
In this section we use simple regression analysis to examine whether OECD countries with 
flexible exchange rates and IT have outperformed countries with alternative monetary 
regimes – in particular countries with fixed exchange rates – in the period 2007-12. As a first 
step, we look at simple differences in terms of average growth between IT and non-IT 
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countries. As a second step, we add control variables in a simple growth-regression 
framework. In a third and final step, we analyse the potential role of real exchange rate 
depreciations in explaining the difference in growth performance between IT and non-IT 
countries. 
3.1 IT and average growth 
According to IMF researchers, 16 of the 34 OECD member countries had adopted IT with 
flexible exchange rates by 2007. These 16 countries are Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 5  Equally many countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Spain) had chosen fixed exchange 
rates in the form of a conventional peg (Denmark) or a common currency (the rest), while 
just two countries (Japan and the US) had chosen flexible exchange rates without IT.6 This 
leaves us with 18 non-IT countries in total in the OECD. It should be noted that two 
countries, Slovakia and Estonia, changed their monetary regime during our observation 
window, 2007-12. Specifically, Slovakia joined the eurozone in 2009 and Estonia in 2011. We 
have coded them as fixed exchange rate regimes, but, as we show below, the results are 
robust to excluding these two countries. Moreover, coding Estonia as an IT country also has 
no implications for our results. 
As a first step in investigating whether IT countries have grown faster than non-IT countries, 
consider Figure 1, which plots average annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2012 
against a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is pursuing IT, and zero otherwise. The 
six top performing IT countries in terms of economic growth (Chile, Israel, Poland, Turkey, 
Korea and Australia) grew faster than the single top-performing non-IT country (Slovakia). 
Moreover, in between Slovakia and the second best-performing non-IT country (Germany) 
are five IT countries (Mexico, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand). At the same 
time, non-IT countries are also clustered at the bottom of the (unconditional) growth 
distribution. The five worst performers (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia) are all 
non-IT countries. Indeed, four of them are members of the notorious group of so-called 
peripheral eurozone countries. Consequently, simply eyeballing the (conditional) growth 
distributions immediately indicates a systematic difference in growth performance between 
IT and non-IT OECD countries. 
                                                   
5  Data on inflation targeting are from Sarwat (2012) and de Carvalho Filho (2010). There is a 
discrepancy between the coding of Switzerland in these two sources. According to the homepage of 
the Swiss central bank, it follows an IT strategy – more specially, it states that it bases its monetary 
policy on a medium-term inflation forecast. We therefore code it as an IT country. Real GDP data are 
from OECD (2013). 
6 As such, we essentially compare IT with a fixed exchange rate regime. Note that the US introduced 
elements of inflation targeting in 2012, but we do not take that into account since it was at the end of 
our observation window. Yet if we include the US in the group of IT countries, the results only 
become stronger. 
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Figure 1. Real GDP growth, 2007-12, in countries without (IT = 0) and with (IT = 1) inflation 
targeting 
 
Note: Ordered from lowest to highest growth rates, the countries ranked in the figure are (IT = 1 in 
boldface): Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Iceland, Hungary, Estonia, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, United Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Czech Republic, Belgium, 
United States, Austria, Norway, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, 
Slovak Republic, Australia, Korea, Turkey, Poland, Israel, Chile.  
Data sources: See Table 1. 
A similar impression emerges upon comparing two neighbouring Nordic countries, 
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returned to the pre-crisis GDP level by 2010, whereas Denmark still has not managed to 
make up for lost ground. As we will argue below, the monetary regime holds significant 
explanatory power in terms of accounting for the differences in GDP trajectories of these two 
countries. 
Figure 2. Evolution of real GDP (2007 = 100) for Denmark (IT = 0) and Sweden (IT = 1) 
 
 
To be a bit more systematic than merely eyeballing and (selectively) choosing country cases 
to compare, consider regressing average annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2012, 
g0712, on the IT dummy variable. This is simply a test of whether the means are different in 
the two subgroups. Results from this exercise are reported in column 1 of Table 1. Inspection 
of the table reveals that average annual growth in the 18 countries that did not pursue 
inflation targeting (IT = 0) was -0.48%. For the group of inflation-targeting countries (IT = 1), 
average annual growth was 1.42%. This amounts to a statistically significant average annual 
growth difference of almost 2 percentage points. Removing the US and Japan from the group 
of non-IT countries would only increase this difference. 
In column 2 of Table 1 we exclude the five peripheral eurozone countries: Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Recall from the discussion above that four of these countries 
were the worst-performing countries in the entire (unconditional) growth distribution, for 
which reason excluding them makes sense as a robustness check. Yet, omitting them changes 
very little. IT countries have still outperformed non-IT countries by some (statistically 
significant) margin; 1.46 percentage points to be precise.  
In column 3 we exclude the 15 OECD countries that are eurozone members – leaving us with 
Denmark, Japan and the US as the only remaining non-IT countries – and again the basic 
conclusion remains. In the remaining columns we change the period over which the GDP 
growth rate is calculated to 2008-12, and again with no implications for the result.  
In sum, viewing the empirical evidence in a straightforward manner and from different 
angles – visually, case-wise and statistically – leads to the same conclusion: IT countries have 
weathered the financial crisis much better than the non-IT countries in the OECD. 
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window. These two countries do not drive our results, as they were excluded from the 
sample with the group of all eurozone countries; i.e., they are excluded in columns 3 and 6 of 
Table 1.  
Table 1. IT and average annual real GDP per capita growth in the OECD, 2007-12 (OLS estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dep. Var. g0712 g0712 g0712 g0812 g0812 g0812 
       
IT  0.0194*** 0.0142*** 0.0161*** 0.0210*** 0.0152*** 0.0146** 
  (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0062) 
 
Constant -0.0048 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0065* -0.0007 -0.0001 
  (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0043) 
       
Obs.  34 29 19 34 29 19 
R-squared 0.320 0.239 0.147 0.305 0.232 0.103 
Excluded None Peripheral Eurozone None Peripheral Eurozone 
Notes: The table reports OLS regressions. Peripheral countries are Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. Real GDP growth between t and T is calculated as ݃ = log(்ܻ / ௧ܻ) /(ܶ − ݐ), where ௧ܻ  is real GDP 
in year t. Coding of IT is based on Sarwat (2012) and de Carvalho Filho (2010), whereas real GDP data 
are from OECD (2013). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
3.2 Cross-sectional growth regressions 
The evidence brought to bear so far cannot tell us whether IT countries did better because 
they entered the crisis in better shape (or had other advantages) – thus being better 
positioned to deal with it in terms of fiscal stimulus, say – or, alternatively, because the 
increased flexibility that comes with an independent monetary policy enabled IT countries to 
better navigate the crisis. Consequently, this dictates that we control for the overall ‘health’ 
of the macroeconomy in 2007, when the global financial crisis started to reverberate.  
We therefore estimate the following simple cross-sectional growth-regression model:  
(1)  ݃0712௜ 	= 	 ܽ଴ 	+ 	ܽଵ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ܽଶ ∙ ܩܣ ௜ܲ 	+ 	ܽଷ ∙ ݃ܲ ௜ܻ 	+ 	ܽସ ∙ ܴܲ௜ 	+ 	ܽହ ∙ ܦܧܤ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ݑ௜ 
where g0712i is average annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2012 for country i. ITi is 
our inflation-targeting dummy, and GAPi is the output gap in country i in 2007, as reported 
by the OECD in its 2013 Economic Outlook database (OECD, 2013). Growth of potential GDP, 
gPYi, is calculated over the period 1997-2007, with the level of potential GDP also being from 
OECD (2013). The price-to-rent ratio in 2007, PRi, is a widely used indicator of housing 
market conditions, which captures the cost of owning a house versus renting it (André, 2010). 
It is measured as the ratio of nominal house prices to the rent ratio of the consumer price 
indicator. A large positive deviation of the price-to-rent ratio from its historical average is an 
indication of overvaluation, and vice versa for a negative deviation. Housing data are from 
the online annex tables to the Economic Outlook.7 DEBTi is gross public debt (Maastricht 
criterion) as a percentage of GDP in 2007; it is from OECD (2013). 
                                                   
7  Available on the OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/ 
economicoutlookannextables.htm).  
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Some motivation for this specification runs as follows: A large output gap indicates that 
productive capacity is unable to keep up with growing aggregate demand; i.e. growth is 
occurring at an unsustainable rate. Such economic ‘overheating’ is generally followed by 
lower than average economic growth because of the need for a ‘correction’. At the same time, 
the output gap captures regression-towards-the-mean effects. A priori, we therefore expect 
ܽଶ < 0. 
The growth rate of potential output captures whether the economy’s ‘speed limit’ has 
increased in the period leading up to the crisis. If IT countries have implemented more 
favourable economic reforms than non-IT countries, then the growth rate of potential output 
will pick up this effect. Including this variable should therefore greatly reduce the scope for 
omitted-variable bias. The flip side of this is that any general positive effect on growth of IT 
compared to non-IT that was also present before the crisis will be removed. This implies that 
by including the potential growth rate among the regressors, we are in reality estimating the 
‘extra’ effect of IT on post-crisis growth. Thus, we should expect the inclusion of potential 
growth to reduce the estimated effect of IT. A priori, we expect ܽଷ > 0. 
The amount of house price overvaluation in 2007 is expected to have a negative impact on 
subsequent growth (ܽସ < 0) by amplifying the negative effects of the crisis. This could 
happen in various ways. Consumption demand, for example, is likely to be negatively 
affected by a (larger) crisis-induced drop in house prices through both a wealth effect and a 
collateral effect. Furthermore, although residential investment is a small component of GDP, 
it is rather volatile and may have a large impact on economic growth, and residential 
construction is labour intensive, thus influencing employment in important ways. 
Finally, the amount of public debt (as a share of nominal GDP) will among other things 
determine the course of the fiscal response to the crisis. Large debt means higher taxes 
and/or lower public spending; it also determines the degree of frontloading of the eventual 
fiscal consolidation measures. Different countries can – depending on macroeconomic 
history – tolerate different levels of debt to GDP, so this variable will probably have a 
heterogeneous effect. For this reason, the point estimate may be difficult to interpret, 
although we will expect it to be negative (ܽହ < 0). 
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation. Only GAP is available for all 34 OECD countries; 
we lose three observations when we add gPY, another six when we add PR, and yet another 
eight when we add DEBT.8 Column 1 therefore starts with regressing GDP growth on IT and 
GAP. This simple regression explains 42% of the variation in growth. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient of GAP has the expected sign and is statistically significant. With IT, 
GAP, and gPY as controls, 60% of the variation in economic growth during the crisis is 
explained, cf. column 2. Yet, as sample sizes differ, values of R-squared cannot be compared 
across columns. As expected, the coefficient of IT drops when we control for potential output 
growth. Still, there seems to be an ‘extra’ post-crisis effect of IT compared to non-IT. 
Adding, respectively, PR in column 3 and DEBT in column 4 changes nothing qualitatively. 
While the point estimate of IT changes somewhat across columns, which is not too surprising 
                                                   
8 Instead of using debt to GDP (Maastricht criterion), we can also use general government gross 
financial liabilities to GDP. The concept of general government financial liabilities applied in the 
OECD Economic Outlook is based on national accounting conventions. These require that liabilities 
are recorded at market prices as opposed to constant nominal prices (as is the case for the Maastricht 
definition of general government debt). If we use general government gross financial liabilities to GDP, 
we can increase the number of observations, and with a correlation between the two measures of 0.9, 
it appears to be worthwhile estimating equation (1) with this alternative debt measure. Consequently, 
Appendix Table A1 re-estimates Table 2 using this alternative variable. As shown in the Table, all our 
conclusions stand.    
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given the changes in the sample size, it stays statistically significant. Table 3 repeats the 
estimations of Table 2, but now using growth over the period 2008-12 as the dependent 
variable. This has only trivial implications for our results.  
Table 2. IT and average annual real GDP per capita growth in the OECD, 2007-12 (OLS growth 
regressions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dep. Var. g0712 g0712 g0712 g0712 
     
IT  0.0164*** 0.0082* 0.0084** 0.0143** 
  (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0058) 
GAP  -0.0022** -0.0054*** -0.0050** -0.0038 
  (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0025) 
gPY   0.0740*** 0.0689** 0.0293 
   (0.0213) (0.0262) (0.0357) 
PR    -0.0001 -0.0002 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) 
DEBT    -0.0003* 
     (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0062 0.0009 0.0144 0.0421* 
  (0.0047) (0.0064) (0.0101) (0.0217) 
     
Obs.  34 31 25 17 
R-squared 0.419 0.597 0.548 0.554 
Notes: The table reports OLS growth regressions of the type ݃0712௜ 	= 	 ܽ଴ 	+ 	ܽଵ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ܽଶ ∙ ܩܣ ௜ܲ 	+
	ܽଷ ∙ ݃ܲ ௜ܻ 	+ 	ܽସ ∙ ܴܲ௜ 	+ 	ܽହ ∙ ܦܧܤ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ݑ௜ . The variables g0712 and IT are described in the text below 
Table 1. New variables are GAP (output gap), gPY (growth of potential output), PR (house-price-to-
rent ratio), and DEBT (gross-debt-to-GDP ratio). All new data are from the OECD. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 3. IT and average annual real GDP per capita growth in the OECD, 2008-12 (OLS growth 
regressions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dep. Var. g0812 g0812 g0812 g0812 
     
IT  0.0180*** 0.0089* 0.0098* 0.0185** 
  (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0065) 
GAP  -0.0021 -0.0060*** -0.0058** -0.0041 
  (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0028) 
gPY   0.0741*** 0.0723** 0.0208  
   (0.0211) (0.0272) (0.0358) 
PR    -0.0001 -0.0002 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) 
DEBT    -0.0003* 
     (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0044 0.0019 0.0136 0.0484* 
  (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0118) (0.0229) 
     
Obs.  34 31 25 17 
R-squared 0.384 0.593 0.566 0.628 
Notes: The table reports OLS growth regressions of the type ݃0812௜ 	= 	 ܽ଴ 	+ 	ܽଵ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ܽଶ ∙ ܩܣ ௜ܲ 	+
	ܽଷ ∙ ݃ܲ ௜ܻ 	+ 	ܽସ ∙ ܴܲ௜ 	+ 	ܽହ ∙ ܦܧܤ ௜ܶ 	+ 	ݑ௜. The variables are described in the text below Tables 1 and 2. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Now the obvious question is: How large is the effect of having an IT regime? As IT is a 0/1 
dummy, multiplying the parameter estimate of ܽଵ  by 100 gives us the growth effect in 
percentage points of switching from IT = 0 to IT = 1. A relatively conservative approach 
based on Table 2 would use a parameter estimate of 0.01. With this estimate, we find that a 
shift in 2007 from not pursuing inflation targeting (IT = 0) to adopting it (IT = 1) would have 
increased average annual real GDP growth by one percentage point.  
Consequently, the robust message that emerges from investigating the empirical evidence in 
different ways is that OECD countries with inflation targeting have weathered the crisis 
much better than OECD countries pursuing a different monetary policy strategy, i.e. 
predominantly countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. 
So far we have not paid explicit attention to potential endogeneity of the monetary regime 
due to omitted (unobserved) variables in (1). This will receive much more attention in a later 
section. However, an interesting way to gauge the potential effects of this is by using the 
approach of Altonji et al. (2005). Essentially we ask the following question: How much 
stronger must selection on unobservables (i.e. omitted variables) be relative to selection on 
observables in order to explain away the entire estimated effect from IT?9  Specifically, 
consider two regressions: one (F) with a full set of controls, which should be representative 
                                                   
9 We employ a specialisation of the Altonji et al. (2005) approach to the linear model not assuming 
joint normality, which is developed in Bellows and Miguel (2008). See also Nunn and Wantchekon 
(2011). 
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of all possible observable controls, and one (N) with no control set. Denote the IT point 
estimates from the first and second regression as ොܽଵி  and ොܽଵே , respectively. We are then 
interested in the ratio ොܽଵி/( ොܽଵே − ොܽଵி). The larger this ratio, the less plausible it is that omitted 
variables can explain away the entire estimated effect of IT on economic growth. The 
intuition is simple: the smaller the denominator, the less the IT estimate is affected by 
controlling for observables, and the larger the ratio. Also, the larger the numerator, the larger 
is the total effect that needs to be explained away.  
In order to quantify this ratio, we use column 1 of Table 1 to retrieve ොܽଵே = 0.0194  and 
column 4 of Table 2 to retrieve ොܽଵி = 0.0143. We thus (courageously) assume that GAP, gPY, 
PR, and DEBT are representative of all observable controls. This is not entirely farfetched; 
column 4 of Table 2 does explain more than 55% of the variation in economic growth during 
2007-12. 
Inserting the estimated coefficients into the expression, ොܽଵி/( ොܽଵே − ොܽଵி), the ratio becomes 0.0143/(0.0194 − 	0.0143) = 2.80. Hence, in order for unobservable controls to explain away 
the entire estimate of IT’s impact on economic growth in column 4 of Table 2, their effect on 
the estimate should be almost three times that of the observable controls. In other words, the 
selection on unobservables should be almost three times as strong as the selection on 
observables. This seems improbable given the control set in column 4 of Table 2. 
3.3 Inflation targeting, real effective exchange rates and export growth 
To understand why OECD countries with an IT strategy have done better than other OECD 
countries, consider again Sweden, which is a country with an IT framework. According to 
the OECD (2011), Sweden’s immediate response to the crisis was to significantly lower its 
policy interest rate. The Swedish real exchange rate depreciated, with the direct consequence 
being an improved Swedish competitiveness.10 Neighbouring Denmark, which has a fixed 
exchange rate against the euro, did not slash interest rates as aggressively as Sweden because 
the ECB did not. Therefore, it did not see the real exchange rate depreciate. This difference 
between Denmark and Sweden appears to be part of a more general trend. As argued by de 
Carvalho Filho (2010), IT countries lowered policy rates by more than non-IT countries in the 
initial years of the crisis; and with their flexible exchange rate regimes, IT countries also saw 
sharper real depreciations.  
To investigate this channel more systematically, we define the change in the real effective 
exchange rate between 2008 and 2009 as DREER = REER2009 – REER2008, where REER is the 
real effective exchange rate with constant trade weights from OECD (2013), and DREER < 0 
represents a depreciation. We then regress DREER on IT; see columns 1-3 of Table 4. 
Consistent with the dynamics described above, IT countries saw their real exchange rates 
depreciate, and thus their export competitiveness improve. On average, IT countries 
experienced 7 percent depreciation while non-IT countries experienced 3 percent 
appreciation over the period 2008-09, cf. column 1 of Table 4. 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 explore whether this improvement in export competitiveness on 
average was associated with an increase in the export volume. More specifically, we regress 
growth in export volume in the first years of the crisis (2008-10) on DREER.11 We denote the 
export growth variable by gx0810, and we use export volume of goods and services in 
                                                   
10 With inflation being low, nominal exchange-rate movements obviously dominate price movements 
in the real exchange rate. 
11 Given J-curve dynamics, one may reasonably wonder whether this is the appropriate period length. 
Had we instead used 2008-11, the results would essentially be the same as those reported in columns 4 
to 6 of Table 4. 
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constant 2005 USD from OECD (2013) to construct it. Examination of columns 4-6 shows that 
DREER indeed predicts export growth. This is also evident from Figure 3, which also shows 
how little the real effective exchange rate has changed in countries with fixed exchange rates.  
Table 4. IT, real effective exchange rates and exports in the OECD, 2008-10 (OLS estimations) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dep. Var. DREER0809 DREER0809 DREER0809 gx0810 gx0810 gx0810 
       
IT  -0.0973*** -0.1029*** -0.1340***    
  (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0270)    
DREER0809    -0.2655*** -0.2340*** -0.1644*** 
     (0.0633) (0.0601) (0.0506) 
Constant 0.0267*** 0.0323*** 0.0633*** -0.0137*** -0.0114** -0.0037 
  (0.0068) (0.0080) (0.0225) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0058) 
       
Obs.  34 29 19 33 28 18 
R-squared 0.551 0.555 0.451 0.308 0.302 0.203 
Excluded None Peripheral Eurozone None Peripheral Eurozone 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 report OLS regressions of the type: ܦܴܧܧܴ0809௜ 	= 	 ܾ଴ 	+ 	ܾଵ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + 	ݑ௜. The IT 
variable is described below Table 1. DREER0809 = REER2009 – REER2008, where REERt is the real 
effective exchange rate (constant trade weights) in year t. Data on REER are from OECD (2013). 
Columns 4 to 6 report OLS regressions of the type: ݃ݔ0810௜ 	= 	 ܿ଴ 	+ 	 ܿଵ ∙ ܦܴܧܧܴ௜ + 	ݑ௜, where gx0810 is 
growth of export volume between 2008 and 2010. The variable is defined as ݃ݔ0810௜ 	= log(ܺଶ଴ଵ଴/
ܺଶ଴଴଼) /2, where Xt is export volume in year t, etc. Export volume data are from OECD (2013). Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of DREER against gx0810, where DREER < 0 signifies a real effective exchange 
rate depreciation 
 
 
Consider next regressing growth of exports in the first years of the crisis on IT for the full 
sample of OECD countries. Results, which are reported in Table 5, show that IT countries 
have experienced faster export growth than non-IT countries. The difference is not trivial. 
Column 1 shows that, on average, non-IT countries saw exports shrink at an annual average 
rate of almost 2.4%, whereas IT countries saw exports expand by roughly 1.0%. As columns 2 
and 3 show, excluding, respectively, peripheral and all eurozone countries does not change 
this conclusion. 
So the question that remains is whether this increase in exports, possibly resulting from the 
real effective exchange rate depreciation, can account for (some of) the difference in growth 
performance between IT and non-IT countries. Table 6 shows that in fact it can. Column 1 
shows that export growth alone during the initial years of the crisis can explain 27% of the 
variation in GDP growth over the period 2008-12. 12  In columns 2 and 3 we exclude, 
respectively, peripheral and eurozone countries. This does not change anything 
fundamentally, although the coefficient on gx0810 is estimated somewhat imprecisely in 
column 3.  
                                                   
12 We have also investigated whether the difference in export volume growth between IT and non-IT is 
a trend phenomenon. It is not. The growth rate of the export volume prior to the crisis (2002-06) was 
the same (statistically speaking) across monetary regimes. This changed after the crisis (2008-10), 
where it (as noted in the text) became much higher in IT countries. 
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Table 5. IT and export growth in the OECD, 2008-10 (OLS estimations) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Dep. Var.  gx0810  gx0810  gx0810 
    
IT   0.0335***  0.0329***  0.0297** 
   (0.0095)  (0.0097)  (0.0130) 
Constant  -0.0237***  -0.0232***  -0.0199* 
   (0.0066)  (0.0068)  (0.0108) 
    
Obs.   33  28  18 
R-squared  0.284  0.305  0.167 
Excluded  None  Peripheral  Eurozone 
Notes: The table reports OLS regressions of the type: ݃ݔ0810௜ 	= 	 ݀଴ 	+ 	݀ଵ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + 	ݑ௜. The IT variable is 
described below Table 1. Growth of export is defined below Table 4. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. 
 
Note then that column 4 indicates that IT also worked through other channels than exports. 
The result is also confirmed when we replace the export measure in column 4 by the change 
in the real effective exchange rate in column 5. This is an important finding as it shows that 
although part of the positive post-crisis effect of IT is likely to have run through a larger real 
depreciation, and hence better export performance, there seems to be more to IT than this, 
e.g. the possibility of conducting more activist monetary policy. For example, the lower 
Swedish interest rate did not only depress the real exchange rate, but is also likely to have 
spurred domestic demand (see also Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985).   
4. Empirical analysis: Extended sample 
In this section we extend the sample with non-OECD countries. The benefit from this 
exercise is obviously that we increase the generality of our results, while the downside is that 
data quality deteriorates in a non-trivial manner. GDP data for some of the world’s poorest 
countries are of extremely poor quality (see, e.g. Jerven, 2013).13 Furthermore, we cannot 
pursue the same “selection on observables” control strategy, as GAP, PR and DEBT are not 
readily available for many countries. 
  
                                                   
13 We use real (constant 2005 USD) GDP per capita data from the World Development Indicators 2013. 
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Table 6. IT, export growth and average annual GDP growth in the OECD, 2008-12 (OLS 
estimations) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dep. Var.  g0812 g0812 g0812 g0812 g0812 
     
gx0810  0.3025** 0.1965** 0.1433 0.1938 
   (0.1108) (0.0835) (0.1231) (0.1235) 
IT      0.0128** 0.0259*** 
      (0.0054) (0.0078) 
DREER      0.0506 
       (0.0650) 
Constant  0.0048* 0.0076** 0.0100** -0.0019 -0.0079** 
    (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0038)
  
Obs.   33 28 18 33 34 
R-squared  0.272 0.158 0.061 0.361 0.319 
Excluded  None Peripheral Eurozone None None 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 report OLS regressions of the type: ݃0812௜ 	= 	 ݁଴ 	+ 	 ݁ଵ ∙ ݃ݔ0810௜ + 	ݑ௜. The g0812 
and gx0810 variables are described below Table 1 and Table 4, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 report 
regressions of the type: ݃0812௜ 	= 	 ଴݂ 	+ 	 ଵ݂ ∙ ܼ௜ + 	 ଶ݂ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + ݑ௜ , where Z is gx0810 in column 4 and 
DREER in column 5. The IT variable is described below Table 1, and DREER below Table 4. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
With respect to the classification of the monetary regime for the non-OECD countries, we 
follow Rose (2014), which, in turn, is based on the IMF’s de facto classification as reported in 
the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).14 Rose 
operates with three categories of monetary regimes: hard fix, floating with an inflation target, 
and the rest. Hard fix means a fixed exchange rate regime in the form of either: a) no 
separate legal tender, b) a currency board arrangement or c) a conventional peg. The second 
group are the IT countries with a floating exchange rate and an independent central bank 
targeting inflation, while the residual group contains a variety of monetary regimes 
including soft fixes and floaters with targets other than inflation. To make the analysis in this 
section directly comparable to that of the previous section, where most countries followed 
either an IT or a fixed exchange rate strategy, we exclude the rest category from the sample 
to begin with. That is, we start by only comparing inflation targeting with a fixed exchange 
rate (the latter group being the omitted category). 
Rose refines his sample further, as do we, by requiring that the regime must be maintained 
continuously throughout the period; i.e. it must be durable.15 There are 60 such durable hard-
fix regime countries when eurozone countries are excluded.16 When the eurozone is included, 
                                                   
14 Data can be downloaded from Rose’s webpage (http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/).  
15 Rose requires durability over the period 2006-12, while we have opted for 2007-12. This choice 
makes no difference to the results. In fact, for the IT countries, only Ghana changes status from 2006-
07. Interestingly, the central bank in Ghana actually claims to have pursued IT ‘unofficially’ since 2005. 
16 The 60 countries with a durable hard fix are: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
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the size of this group is 74 countries.17 With respect to IT countries, there are 27 durable 
inflation targeters in the group of all inflation-targeting countries.18  
We work with three different samples in this section. Sample 1 includes the group of 27 
durable inflation-targeting countries and the group of 60 durable hard-fix countries; i.e. there 
are 87 countries in sample 1. Sample 2 adds the eurozone countries to sample 1, so there are 
101 countries in sample 2. The two samples allow us to compare in a ‘clean’ way the relative 
performance of the two groups with well-defined monetary regimes. For completeness, 
however, we will also report on what happens in the full sample when all countries for 
which data exist are included in the empirical analysis and when we don’t discern between 
durable and non-durable regimes. Sample 3 thus includes 190 countries. 
4.1 Panel growth regressions 
For estimation purposes, we use the standard growth-regression framework. This 
framework has often been used to gauge the impact of monetary regimes on economic 
growth (see Tavlas et al., 2008 for an extensive list of literature references). More specifically, 
consider the following growth regression in a panel-data setting: 
(2) ௜݃௧ = ܽ଴ + ܽଵ ∙ log(ݕ௜௧ିଵ) + ܽଶ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + ∑ ߛ௦ ∙ ݀௦,௜௧்௦ୀଶ + ∑ ߛ௝ ∙ ௝݀,௜௃௝ୀଶ + ݑ௜௧  
In equation (2), ௜݃௧ = log(ݕ௜௧ ݕ௜௧ିଵ⁄ ), where log(ݕ௜௧ିଵ) is the (log of) one-period lagged real 
GDP per capita, ܫ ௜ܶ the durable inflation-targeting dummy (the omitted category is hard-fix 
regimes), ݀௦,௜௧ is a time dummy equal to one if ݐ	 = 	ݏ and equal to zero otherwise, and ௝݀,௜ is 
a regional dummy equal to 1 if country ݅ is located in region ݆ and zero otherwise. 
Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of equation (2) using random-effects 
estimation on a panel covering the years 2007-12. Several things should be noted. First, the IT 
point estimate is positive and significant at the 1% level in all columns. Second, the IT point 
estimate stays the same regardless of whether the eurozone is excluded (columns 1 and 3) or 
included (columns 2 and 4). Third, the IT point estimate is very close to that found in the 
cross-sectional exercise using only OECD data in the previous section. Consequently, we 
conclude that the correlation between IT and economic growth during 2007-12 is not limited 
to the OECD sample. When comparing all the durable IT regimes with all the durable hard-
fix regimes, the former group has significantly outperformed the latter during the 2007-12 
period.  
                                                                                                                                                               
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Rep.), Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea-
Bissau, Hong Kong, Jordan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Mali, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Palau, Panama, Qatar, Samoa, San 
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo and United Arab Emirates.  
17 The eurozone countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Note that Germany is missing, 
which is because Rose (2014) does not include Germany in his dataset. We have chosen to follows his 
lead, because it is very difficult to say whether Germany is indeed a hard fix or in fact something else; 
being the biggest economy in the eurozone, Germany obviously receives special attention by the ECB. 
18 The 27 inflation targeters are: Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Korea (Rep.), Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland (not coded as IT regime in 
AREAER 2012), Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom.  
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Table 7. IT and GDP per capita growth, extended sample, 2007-12 (Random effects panel estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dep. Var. g g g g 
     
IT  0.0169*** 0.0167*** 0.0160*** 0.0168*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0038) 
Log(yt-1) -0.0085*** -0.0082*** -0.0103*** -0.0100*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0026) 
Constant 0.0980*** 0.0993*** 0.1143*** 0.1143*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0143) (0.0241) (0.0224) 
Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE  No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.221 0.265 0.237 0.279 
Obs.  506 590 506 590 
Countries 87 101 87 101 
Excluded Eurozone None Eurozone None 
Notes: The table estimates a panel growth regression of the following type: ݃௜௧ = ܽ଴ + ܽଵ ∙ log(ݕ௜௧ିଵ) +
ܽଶ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + ∑ ߛ௦ ∙ ݀௦,௜௧்௦ୀଶ + ∑ ߛ௝ ∙ ௝݀,௜௃௝ୀଶ + ݑ௜௧ , where ݃௜௧ = log(ݕ௜௧ ݕ௜௧ିଵ⁄ ) , log(ݕ௜௧ିଵ)  is the (log of) one-
period lagged real GDP per capita, ܫܶ௜ the durable inflation targeting dummy (omitted category is 
hard-fix regimes), ݀௦,௜௧  is a time dummy equal to one if ݐ	 = 	ݏ and equal to zero otherwise, and ௝݀,௜ is a 
regional dummy equal to 1 if country ݅ is located in region ݆ and zero otherwise. Data on real GDP per 
capita are from World Development Indicators 2013; data on monetary regimes are from Rose (2014). 
In columns 1 and 2 we have imposed the assumption that the ߛ௝ᇱݏ = 0; in columns 3 and 4, we 
estimate the full model. The regions are: East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & 
Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa; North America, South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
regional groupings are taken from World Development Indicators 2013. All standard errors are 
clustered at the country level.  
4.2 Instrumental variables (IV) regression 
In order to take the potential endogeneity of the monetary regime into account, Table 8 
reports IV estimation results using (the log of) total population as an instrument for IT. The 
rationale is that smaller economies are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate, whereas 
larger economies are more likely to adopt an IT regime (see e.g. Rose, 2014). Moreover, scale 
effects are not a feature of economic growth at the country level (see e.g. Romer, 2006), for 
which reason the exclusion restriction should be valid. In other words, population size 
should have no direct effect on economic growth or an effect through other channels, but 
only an indirect effect running through the monetary regime.  
In column 1 of Table 7 we estimate the model using sample 1 (the sample without eurozone 
countries) and 2SLS (two-stage least-squares). The first thing to notice is that the instrument 
is very strong; a conclusion that follows immediately upon noting that the F-statistic from 
the first stage is in excess of 94. In column 2 we use sample 2 instead (i.e. we add the 
eurozone countries to sample 1). This does not change the basic message of column 1; indeed, 
the point estimate is the same and the instrument remains very strong. Without over-
identification we cannot perform formal OID (over-identification) tests. An informal 
alternative to OID is to simply add the instrument to the regression. Validity of the exclusion 
restriction would suggest that the instrument is insignificant once IT is controlled for. 
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Inspection of column 3 of the table reveals that this is indeed the case. Finally, in columns 4-6, 
we add regional fixed effects to the model and perform a similar exercise to that of columns 
1-3. The message emerging from columns 4-6 is exactly the same as that emerging from 
columns 1-3. 
The IT point estimates in Table 8 are slightly larger than those reported in Table 7. However, 
the difference is not statistically significant. Overall, therefore, IV leads to similar conclusions 
as random effects estimation. 
Table 8. IT and GDP per capita growth, extended sample, 2007-12 (2SLS (IV) and random effects 
(RE) panel estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. g g g g g g 
Estimator IV IV RE IV IV RE
  
IT  0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0146*** 0.0213*** 0.0211*** 0.0149*** 
  (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0057) 
Log(yt-1) -0.0083*** -0.0080*** -0.0081*** -0.0091*** -0.0089*** -0.0098*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
Log(pop)   0.0008   0.0007 
    (0.0010)   (0.0012) 
Constant 0.0946*** 0.0960*** 0.0860*** 0.1017*** 0.1031*** 0.1033*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0254) (0.0227) (0.0217) (0.0319) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
  
R-squared 0.219 0.263 0.267 0.236 0.278 0.280 
F first stage 94.08 44.07  133.62 66.58 
Obs.  506 590 590 506 590 590 
Countries 87 101 101 87 101 101 
Excluded Eurozone None None Eurozone None None 
Notes: The table estimates equations of the type: ݃௜௧ = ܽ଴ + ܽଵ ∙ log(ݕ௜௧ିଵ) + ܽଶ ∙ ܫ ௜ܶ + ∑ ߛ௦ ∙ ݀௦,௜௧்௦ୀଶ +
∑ ߛ௝ ∙ ௝݀ ,௜௃௝ୀଶ + ݑ௜௧ . For information on variable definitions and sources, see notes below Table 7. In 
columns 1 to 3 we have imposed the assumption that the ߛ௝
′
ݏ = 0; in columns 4 to 6, we estimate the 
full model. Columns 2 and 5 use 2SLS estimation with (the log of) total population as instrument for 
IT. Columns 3 and 6 check the exclusion restriction by adding total population to the outcome 
equation. All standard errors are clustered at the country level. “F first stage” refers to the F test of the 
null hypothesis that population is zero in the first-stage equation. 
4.3 Treatment-effects regression 
There is an interesting alternative to 2SLS estimation, which allows us to gauge the 
consequences of endogeneity by exploiting directly the fact that the (potential) endogenous 
regressor, IT, is a binary variable. In particular, the so-called ‘treatment-effects model’ also 
assumes that the conditional mean is linear, but it adds more structure, first, by changing the 
first-stage model to be a latent-variable model and, second, by assuming that the error terms 
of the regression equation and the selection equation are bivariate normal. If the normality 
assumption is untenable, this identification strategy is obviously fragile; if it is tenable, the 
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treatment effects model will provide increased precision of the estimation. 
More formally, the treatment-effects model adds the following latent variable equation to 
equation (2) to form a system of equations: 
(3)  ܫ ௜ܶ௧∗ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ ∙ log(population௜௧) + ݁௜௧ 
ܫ ௜ܶ௧ = 1  if ܫ ௜ܶ௧∗ > 0 , and zero otherwise. Furthermore, (ݑ௜௧ ,݁௜௧)  follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with covariance matrix: 
൤ߪ
ଶ ߩߪ
ߩߪ 1 ൨ 
The average treatment effect is then given as 
(4) ܧ൫ ௜݃௧หܫ ௜ܶ = 1,ݕ௜௧ିଵ,݀௦,௜௧ , ௝݀,௜൯ − ܧ൫ ௜݃௧หܫ ௜ܶ = 0,ݕ௜௧ିଵ,݀௦,௜௧ , ௝݀,௜൯ = ܽଶ + ߩ ∙ ߪ ∙ ߣ௜௧ 
In equation (4), ߣ௜௧ = ߶௜௧/(Φ௜௧ቀ1−Φ௜௧ቁ), where ߶௜௧ and Φ௜௧ are the standard normal density 
and the standard normal cumulative distribution function, respectively.19 The treatment-
effects model can be implemented using full maximum likelihood estimation.20    
Table 9 reports results from full maximum likelihood estimation of the treatment-effects 
model. A quick look at the table reveals that IT is always statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Moreover, the IT point estimate is once again very similar in size to that reported in the 
cross-sectional regressions on the OECD sample (Tables 2 and 3), the panel random-effects 
growth regressions on the extended sample (Table 7) and the IV panel growth regressions on 
the extended sample (Table 8).    
Table 9. IT and GDP per capita growth, extended sample, 2007-12 (Treatment-effects estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. g g g g 
 
IT 0.0179*** 0.0180** 0.0172*** 0.0174** 
(0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0057) (0.0068) 
Log(yt-1) -0.0074*** -0.0077*** -0.0085*** -0.0088*** 
(0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0026) 
Constant 0.0886*** 0.0940*** 0.0990*** 0.1041*** 
(0.0225) (0.0159) (0.0262) (0.0231) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 506 590 506 590 
Countries 
Excluded 
87 
Eurozone 
101 
None 
87 
Eurozone 
101 
None 
 
Notes: The table estimates an average treatment effect of the type: ܧ൫݃௜௧หܫ ௜ܶ = 1, ݕ௜௧ିଵ,݀௦,௜௧ , ௝݀,௜൯ −
ܧ൫݃௜௧หܫ ௜ܶ = 0,ݕ௜௧ିଵ,݀௦,௜௧ , ௝݀ ,௜൯ = ܽଶ + ߩ ∙ ߪ ∙ ߣ௜௧ using the treatment-effects methodology. The treatment-
effects model assumes that the conditional mean is linear, as in equation (2), but it adds more 
                                                   
19 In the text, we have suppressed the fact that ߶௜௧ and Φ௜௧ are functions of the log of population.  
20 We use the treatreg command in Stata. Textbook presentations of the treatment-effects model are 
given in e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2005, ch. 25), Greene (2008, ch. 24), and Guo and Fraser (2010, ch. 
4). 
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structure than IV, first, by changing the first-stage model to be a latent-variable model and, second, by 
assuming that the error terms of the regression equation and selection equation are correlated 
bivariate normal.  For information on variable definitions and sources, see notes below Table 7. All 
standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
4.4 Additional robustness checks 
A final check of the robustness of our results consists of performing the analysis on the full 
sample of countries for which data are available. Here we compare IT regimes with all 
alternative regimes, and we do not pay attention to whether monetary regimes are durable 
or not. That is, we simple re-estimate our model in (2) on the full sample, with the key 
difference being that the IT variable is now time-varying (ܫ ௜ܶ௧) as opposed to time-invariant (ܫ ௜ܶ) as in equation (2). Table 10 provides the results. 
Inspection of Table 10 shows that the coefficient of IT is always statistically significant 
regardless of which estimator we use. Moreover, columns 1 and 4 reveal that random effects 
estimation on the full sample delivers slightly smaller estimates than in the restricted 
(durable regimes) sample of Table 7, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) show that correcting for potential endogeneity of IT using 2SLS 
(treatment effects) leads to slightly higher estimates, but again the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Consequently, using all countries for which data are available and allowing monetary 
regimes to be both durable and non-durable does not change (statistically speaking) any of 
the results presented in this paper.  Furthermore, the results show that when we compare IT 
regimes with all other regimes, we still find that IT regimes outperform the others as a group.  
Table 10. IT and GDP per capita growth, extended sample with all countries, 2007-12 (Random 
effects (RE), 2SLS (IV) and treatment-effects (TE) panel estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator RE IV TE RE IV TE 
Dep. Var g g g g g g 
              
IT 0.0103*** 0.0321** 0.0343** 0.0092** 0.0259* 0.0299** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0037) (0.0133) (0.0152) 
Log(yt-1) -0.0073*** -0.0082*** -0.0066*** -0.0086*** -0.0086*** -0.0076*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
Constant 0.0994*** 0.1040*** 0.0899*** 0.1181*** 0.1152*** 0.1069*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0143) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,094 1,094 1,094 1,094 1,094 1,094 
F first stage  22.22   23.54  
R-squared 0.209 0.179 
 
0.234 0.217 
 Countries 190 190 190 190 190 190 
Notes: The table re-estimates columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 (columns 1 and 4), columns 2 and 5 of Table 8 
(columns 2 and 5), and columns 2 and 4 of Table 9 (columns 3 and 6) using all countries for which data 
is available. Moreover, monetary regimes are both durable and non-durable; i.e. IT is a time varying 
variable. See the respective tables for information on variable definitions and data sources. All 
standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have shown that OECD countries with an IT monetary policy framework 
have systematically outperformed OECD countries with other regimes (predominantly fixed 
exchange rates) in terms of economic growth during the period 2007-12. We have also shown 
that part of this outperformance can likely be ascribed to the exchange rate flexibility of the 
IT countries and hence to an improved export performance resulting from currency 
depreciations. Nevertheless, our analysis also shows that there seems to be more to IT than 
simple beggar-thy-neighbour effects. Thus, when controlling for improved export 
performance (or real depreciations), we still find a significantly positive (residual) effect of IT 
compared to non-IT countries. This could for example be due to independent effects of a 
more aggressive monetary policy, i.e., effects not running through the exchange rate. 
Identifying the exact transmission mechanism is an area where further research is warranted. 
Moreover, as a robustness check, we have also compared IT regimes with fixed exchange 
rate regimes on an extended sample of more than 100 countries using random effects, 2SLS 
and treatment effects regressions. All analyses confirmed the positive relationship between 
IT and economic growth since the Great Recession. 
It would be imprudent to claim that one monetary policy regime always and everywhere 
dominates all other regimes. However, we trust that our empirical analysis demonstrates 
that the choice of monetary regime is not irrelevant, as e.g. Rose (2011, 2014) claims it is. 
Indeed, our results indicate that the choice of monetary regime can be very important for 
economic growth – especially in times when flexibility matters the most, which is arguably 
when a huge adverse shock hits as it did in 2007-08. Our findings thus echo one of the 
important policy lessons learned from the 1930s (see Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Bernanke, 
1995), namely the important role played by currency depreciation (i.e. going off gold) in 
escaping the negative growth dynamics of the Great Depression. 
The basic insight of our paper is particularly important at the current juncture, where there is 
little debate and/or consensus about the cost and benefits of the different monetary and 
exchange rate regimes. For example, this type of analysis, which suggests tangible growth 
benefits of an IT regime with a flexible exchange rate in a crisis situation compared to (at 
least) a fixed exchange rate regime, should be a part of the set of considerations for eastern 
European countries considering joining the euro, and other countries are considering 
abandoning a flexible exchange rate regime. 
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Appendix  
Table A1. IT and average growth in the OECD, 2007-12 (OLS growth regressions, alternative debt 
measure) 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var.  g0712 g0812 
   
IT  0.0072* 0.0085* 
  (0.0041) (0.0048) 
GAP  -0.0043*** -0.0050*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0017) 
gPY  0.0297 0.0308 
  (0.0216) (0.0248) 
PR  -0.0002* -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
DEBT  -0.0002* -0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant  0.0375** 0.0381** 
  (0.0147) (0.0178) 
   
Observations 25 25 
R-squared  0.627 0.636 
Notes: The table re-estimates column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 using general government gross financial 
liabilities to GDP instead of gross debt to GDP (Maastricht criterion), the latter being used in Tables 2 
and 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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